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Kazakhstan and Turkey are two very different countries. But, at the helm of each, is a leader 
with political ambitions that dominate the state. While Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip 
Erdo!an and Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbayev have different levels of authority 
and control, their political success has largely come through manipulating their countries’ 
constitutions, consolidating elite political networks, and using the states’ resource wealth to 
reward and punish allies and opponents.  
Contrasting the political strategies of these two figures reveals much about how ambitious, 
dictatorial leaders in the Middle East and Central Asia maintain and entrench their power. 
Manipulating a Constitution 
At the age of seventy-six, Nazarbayev has served as president and dictator of Kazakhstan since 
its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. Throughout his rule, Nazarbayev has used 
constitutional amendments to entrench his position and influence.  
A constitutional referendum in 1995 considerably expanded Nazarbayev’s power by giving him 
control over appointing the prime minister, ministers, heads of regional administrations, as 
well as the ability to dissolve parliament. In 2007, constitutional amendments, which gave 
some powers to parliament, also lifted the term limits for Nazarbayev to serve as president. In 
2010, parliament passed a law that gave Nazarbayev special status as ‘leader of the nation,’ 
while extending life-long immunity from prosecution to both him and his family members.  
Taken as a whole, these measures have given Nazarbayev a great deal of influence over 
domestic and foreign policy, and made both him and his family virtually unaccountable for 
their actions.   
Adopting a similar strategy, Erdo!an has tried to use his country’s constitution to consolidate 
his own power. Since assuming the presidency in 2014, he has made no secret of his desire to 
change the constitution in favor of an executive system that centralizes authority in his hands.  
Historically, Turkey has been a parliamentary system, with institutional checks to prevent 
accumulations of power in a single executive figure. As history has demonstrated, however, 
whenever there have been formal barriers to his ambition, Erdo!an has simply changed the 
rules of the game.  
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In 2007, the AKP, Erdo!an’s party, called for a referendum aimed at changing the 
constitution so that the president would no longer be nominated and elected by parliament 
and, instead, selected by popular vote. The amendment limited the president to a term of five 
years instead of the previous seven, but allowed all presidents who were elected after the 
amendment’s implementation to stand for a second term.  
In retrospect, these changes were intended to position Erdo!an for a seamless transition from 
prime minister to president, at the expense of his political rivals, and to shift Turkey away from 
a parliamentary system.  
Another constitutional referendum was held in 2010, which was even more important. This 
referendum was a power play by the AKP, aimed at removing the military’s outsized influence 
on Turkish politics. Since the military coup of 1980, the Turkish army had served as the 
ultimate guardian of the country’s political order. Under Turkey’s 1982 constitution, it was 
insulated from political pressure and prosecution.  
The referendum was successful and, as a result, members of the 
armed forces were stripped of their immunity from civilian 
prosecution. Mass trials of the military’s high command quickly 
followed, allowing Erdo!an to remove the most potent challenge 
to his power. 
The 2010 referendum brought reforms to the judiciary that also 
benefitted Erdo!an. Turkey’s Constitutional Court was increased 
in size from eleven to seventeen permanent justices. While 
superficially the move was intended to comply with EU standards, in reality, it was used to 
stack the court with allies of Erdo!an and the AKP. The pool of available judges for 
promotion to the Constitutional Court was widened to include an additional five lower 
courts, as well as senior administrative officers and lawyers. This gave the president, who can 
appoint four of the Court’s members, even more of a chance to select someone to his liking. 
Still unsatisfied, Erdo!an began maneuvering for further constitutional amendments that 
would give the president legally binding executive powers and the authority to potentially 
disband parliament. After the AKP failed to secure a majority in the June 2015 parliamentary 
elections, it seemed these changes would not materialize. But, after the newly seated 
parliament failed to form a coalition government, snap elections were called in November. 
The AKP won this contest, thanks to a sustained media campaign intended to maximize fears 
over instability in the country.  
Though this result seemed to bode well for 
Erdo!an’s political ambitions, the Turkish opposition 
has, so far, prevented him from securing his position 
as the country’s de facto dictator. While members of 
Turkey's opposition are known for their mutual 
antipathy, they found a degree of common ground in 
an absolute refusal to endorse Erdo!an's ambitions 
for a third constitutional referendum; similar barriers 
have been virtually non-existent in Kazakhstan, where 
no meaningful political opposition exists.  
!
“MASS TRIALS OF THE
MILITARY’S HIGH
COMMAND ALLOWED 
ERDO!AN TO
REMOVE THE MOST 
POTENT CHALLENGE 
TO HIS POWER.” 
!
“TURKEY'S OPPOSITION FOUND
COMMON GROUND IN AN 
ABSOLUTE REFUSAL TO 
ENDORSE ERDO!AN'S
AMBITIONS FOR A THIRD 
CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM 
– SIMILAR BARRIERS HAVE BEEN
VIRTUALLY NON-EXISTENT IN
KAZAKHSTAN” 
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Nurturing Elite Networks 
For both Nazarbayev and Erdo!an, consolidating power has required more than just passing 
laws. It has also demanded networks of loyal, elite business and political allies.  
In Kazakhstan, Nazarbayev has developed an inner 
circle that represents his interests in the government 
and economy. This elite’s top tier is composed of the 
president’s family. His eldest daughter, Dariga 
Nazarbayeva, became deputy prime minister in 
September 2015. Her son, Nurali Aliyev, is deputy 
mayor of the capital, Astana.  
Nazarbayev’s family members are also among the wealthiest individuals in the country. His 
middle daughter, Dinara, and her husband, Timur Kulibayev, hold stakes in important 
sectors, such as finance, oil, and gas. 
For his part, Erdo!an has developed an elite network that is 
specifically aimed at circumventing his political opponents, 
and exerting his control and influence over the state. Figures 
like Ethem Sancak and Mehmet Cengiz have become 
notorious for allegedly contributing millions of dollars to 
purchase media outlets that have been converted into pro-
government mouthpieces. In return for their loyalty, these 
men have obtained preferential access to tenders for massive 
state infrastructure projects that have driven the growth of 
the AKP's economy. 
In September 2015, Erdo!an manipulated elections for the AKP's main policy-making unit, 
the Central Decision and Administrative Board, to secure places for his son-in-law, Berat 
Albayrak, and other political allies. At least 34 percent of the appointees elected in September 
had a direct personal relationship with Erdo!an.  
The brother of Erdo!an's lawyer has also been appointed head of the Supreme Board of 
Judges and Prosecutors, effectively giving Erdo!an oversight over political and judicial 
decision-making. In November 2015, when Prime Minister Ahmet Davuto!lu announced his 
new cabinet, it included key positions for Erdo!an’s son-in-law and several of his long-term 
personal advisors. 
Maintaining Loyalty 
In both Kazakhstan and Turkey, the president has maintained political loyalty through the 
distribution of resource wealth. While the intentions are the same, the type of resources 
available for distribution in the two countries differs.   
“IN BOTH COUNTRIES THE PRESIDENT HAS MAINTAINED POLITICAL
LOYALTY THROUGH THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH” !
!
“NAZARBAYEV HAS
DEVELOPED AN INNER CIRCLE 
THAT REPRESENTS HIS 
INTERESTS IN THE 
GOVERNMENT AND ECONOMY” 
!
“ERDO!AN HAS
DEVELOPED AN ELITE 
NETWORK SPECIFICALLY 
AIMED AT 
CIRCUMVENTING HIS 
POLITICAL OPPONENTS” 
!
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In Kazakhstan, Nazarbayev has rewarded his elite network with wealth from the country’s 
vast oil reserves. He has also distributed positions in government and valuable, state-run 
enterprise to his allies. With his close connections to Nazarbayev and his family, Karim 
Massimov, Kazakhstan’s longest serving prime minister, heads the state’s Sovereign Wealth 
Fund, Samruk-Kazyna, and has allegedly secured interests in the telecoms industry.  
Lacking access to the same kind of natural resources, Erdo!an has distributed valuable state 
procurement contracts to his business allies, in exchange for public displays of loyalty and 
contributions to NGOs run by his family members. As president, Erdo!an has managed to 
secure a private discretionary fund estimated at $700 million, which he has leveraged to 
finance his political agenda, as well as legislation establishing a parallel court system he has 
used to seize his opponents’ business assets. 
A Contested Path to Regime Consolidation 
The perennial concern for any dictator is what the future holds, if and when he is no longer in 
power. Over more than twenty-five years as Kazakhstan’s unchallenged ruler, Nazarbayev has 
relied on informal tools of influence to create a political system that has ensured his family’s 
wealth and legacy will remain secure when he leaves office. This approach has fundamentally 
undermined democratic development in Kazakhstan and limited the state’s economic 
potential.  
Undeniably, the Turkish political environment is far less dysfunctional and retains democratic 
institutions. But, despite its tradition of multi-party politics and a history of checks to 
authoritarianism, Turkey’s democracy is under threat from Erdo!an’s ambitions. With a 
single-minded approach to personal power, Erdo!an has undermined the country’s political 
institutions. 
Comparing Kazakhstan and Turkey reveals the pressures and incentives for capturing state 
power in the Middle East and Central Asia. It suggests that a vibrant opposition is key to 
preventing authoritarianism. At the same time, even in a country like Turkey, where party 
politics is vibrant, elite networks and control over resource wealth can go a long way toward 
chipping away at the institutional obstacles that prevent a dictator from rising to power.  
“COMPARING KAZAKHSTAN AND TURKEY REVEALS THE PRESSURES AND INCENTIVES
FOR CAPTURING STATE POWER IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND CENTRAL ASIA” !
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